Personal Property by Cook, Robert N.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 3
1953
Personal Property
Robert N. Cook
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Robert N. Cook, Personal Property, 4 W. Res. L. Rev. 249 (1953)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol4/iss3/25
SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1952
without creating a parmership. This relationship contemplates the right of
joint proprietorship or control of the enterprise with an equal right to
direct and govern the movements and conduct of each other with respect to
the objects or purposes of the undertaking. In this case, since the relation-
ship existng between the parties was not such as to create a community of
interest between the parties in the complete enterprise, no joint enterprise or
adventure existed.
Withberspoon v. Haft affords a good example of the elements which will
tend to support the existence of a joint adventure. In this case the supreme
court declared that a joint adventure may exist in a situation where two
persons agree to furnish at their own expense the component elements of
a completed structure, namely materials and labor, and to divide the net
proceeds from the rental after sharing in the expenses equally.
The procedural necessity of joining partners was raised in Dwyer v.
Wiley Hotel Co.' The court of appeals by way of dictum stated that it is
not necessary that a dormant or silent partner be made a party defendant.
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PERSONAL PROPERTY
The lower courts of Ohio have decided a number of cases involving
gifts. In all of these cases1 except one2 the decisions are acceptable. The
decision of Gladieux v. Parney3 seems incorrect because the court refused to
take judicial notice of Treasury Department Regulations which set forth the
rights of persons whose names appear on United States Savings Bonds. The
courts of Ohio take judicial notice of all federal laws.4 Valid Treasury De-
partment Regulations are federal law and are readily available.
The Ohio Supreme Court in 19445 carefully explained the difference
'Surviving co-owner of Umted States Savings Bond is sole owner. In re Reiner's
Estate, 106 N.E.2d 94 (Hamilton Probate Ct. 1952); lo re Chittock's Estate, 106
N.E.2d 320 (Lake Probate Ct. 1952). No right of survivorship in bank account
in names of "R.D. Chittock-Effie Chittock (Mrs. R.D.) Either may draw."
In re Chittock's Estate, supra. Evidence held insufficient to support gift of certifi-
cates of deposit by surviving co-owner of advanced years to estate of deceased co-
owner. Hoover v. Hoover, 90 Ohio App. 148, 104 N.E.2d 41 (1950). Surviving
non-contributing co-owner of "survivorship bank account" unable to prove gift from
contributing co-owner. In re Byers' Estate, 102 N.E.2d 721 (Ohio App. 1951).
Donee in confidential relationship with donor does not have to prove that donor
relied on independent advice to sustain the gift. Federman v. Stanwyck, 108 N.E.2d
339 (Ohio App. 1951).
'Gladieux v. Pamey, 106 N.E.2d 317 (Ohio App. 1951).
' lbi.
'Erie R.R. v. Welsh, 89 Ohio St. 81, 105 N.E. 189 (1913).
5Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantne, 144 Ohio St. 275, 58 N.E.2d 658 (1944).
19531
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
between the burden of going forward and the burden of proof (risk of
non-persuasion) in either a contractual or tort action by a bailor against a
bailee because of the bailee's failure to redeliver the chattel. The court
dearly stated that the burden of proof (risk of non-persuasion) does not
shift from the bailor to the bailee. After the bailor proves the bailment and
the failure of the bailee to redeliver the chattel, there is a presumption that
the loss of the chattel was due to the negligence of the bailee. The bailee
then has the burden of going forward with the evidence, ;.e., of showing that
his failure to return the chattel was not due to his negligence. Proof by
the bailee that the chattel was destroyed by fire or was stolen is not sufficient
to rebut the presumption. In Cettury Insurance Co. v. Fazi 6 the court
found that the bailee had met the burden of going forward with the evidence
and the court of appeals ordered judgment for the defendant bailee. In
Keagle v. Uffor?7 the bailor proved the bailee's negligence by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.
If the bailee is a warehouseman and fails to return the goods to the
bailor, Ohio General Code Section 8464 as construed by the Ohio Supreme
Courts requires the bailee to prove by a preponderance of all the evidence
a lawful excuse for his failure to redeliver the goods on demand. Thus
cases involving warehousemen as bailees should be distinguished from ordi-
nary bailor-bailee cases, for in the warehouse cases the risk of non-persua-
sion is on the bailee warehouseman. The tendency of the supreme court and
lower Ohio courts'0 to cite, in cases involving warehousemen as bailees, the
cases involving ordinary bailors and bailees may have caused some confu-
sion. In Cody v. Miller& " the court of appeals properly held that, in an
action by the bailor for breach of the contract of bailment by a warehouse-
man, the bailor's introduction of evidence to show that the bailee was negli-
gent did not shift to the bailor the burden of proving (risk of non-persua-
sion) that the loss was caused by the bailee warehouseman's negligence.
Cases involving parking lots often state that the issue is whether there
was a bailment or lease. The issue in these parking lot cases might have
been more clearly stated as whether there was an actual bailment or merely
a license to park for a fixed fee. It is, of course, possible to lease parking
space, 1.e., to acquire a possessory interest in the land upon which the lessee
'102 N.E.2d 612 (Ohio App. 1951).
1103 N.E.2d 20 (Ashtabula Mun. Ct. 1950).
'Hanlon v. J.E. Miller Transfer & Storage Co., 149 Ohio St. 387, 79 N.E.2d 220
(1948).
'Ibid.
"E.g., Cody v. Miller, 91 Ohio App. 36, 102 N.E.2d 727 (1951), appeal dismissed,
156 Ohio St. 246, 102 N.E.2d 19 (1951)
U ibid.
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